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John Perry’s Neo-Humean Compatibilism:  
Initiative and Free Agency 
 
John Perry has recently developed a form of Compatibilism that respects the 
Principle of Alternatives (PA), according to which free agency requires having the ability 
to do more than one thing.
1
 Eschewing so-called Frankfurt counterexamples to this 
intuitively plausible principle, long the bête noire of those who would like to believe in 
free agency and Determinism, Perry argues that there is an important sense in which we 
can act differently than we do.  It signifies the “natural” property of having a latent 
ability, a notion free of the mysteriousness surrounding accounts based on religious or 
even philosophical considerations, yet sufficient to ground our assignments of praise and 
blame.  Perry goes on to advise abandoning such accounts in favor of his common sense 
approach. 
I argue that Perry’s Compatibilism (PC) leads to the same objection as other  
Humean accounts (as explicated below) and fails to account for certain intuitions 
regarding self-control and initiative.  I conclude with an assessment of the prospects for 
his proposed revision.  
PC 
I am grocery shopping.  Looking at my wife’s list, I see ‘2 Spartan paper towels 
(fruit and vegetable print)’.  Sans the parenthetical part of the directive, I’d grab the two 
closest Spartans and move on.  But, it’s a small request, so I stop and search until I have 
the secured the listed items.  To comply with it, certain simple movements were required 
of me, which I performed because of my desire to please my wife.  But neither the 
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awareness of that desire nor the performance of those movements rendered me 
incompetent to perform the (even simpler) movements amounting to my druthers- any 
more than batting right-handed against Sandy Koufax took away switch-hitting Pete 
Rose’s ability to go up to the plate left-handed when Bob Gibson was pitching.   
Perry’s switch-hitter analysis (SHA) as I shall call it, of the freedom present in 
such a case contains three clauses: the convention clause, according to which there are 
“accomplishments” entailed by the execution of series of movements of different types 
within a situation of a certain sort and the opportunity and dual competency clauses, 
which require an agent to be positioned and have the “unimpaired competence” to bring 
about more than one such accomplishment.
2
  Putting them together: an agent in 
performing an action satisfies PA (so as to be free) if he is in a situation where 
movements that he has the unimpaired competence to execute would be an alternative 
accomplishment: free agency is a matter of being in a position to bring about more than 
one accomplishment, thereby making oneself an appropriate object of a reactive attitude.   
Whether or not this standard is met is not dependent upon antecedent choices: an 
agent either has the required opportunity and unimpaired competence to do something 
else or he does not.  For this reason, Perry distances himself from the Conditional 
Analysis of PA satisfaction popular amongst Compatibilists prior to their coming to 
prefer the use of Frankfurt counterexamples.
3
 On this view, it cannot be said that of even 
a free agent that he can categorically act otherwise, it being only conditionally true that 
he could do something else: had he chosen differently he would have taken different 
course of action.  
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SHA is undoubtedly widely applicable.
4
 Were I to inconsiderately disregard my 
wife’s simple request and then try to justify it by appealing to hurriedness, I would rightly 
be met with indignation of the form ‘You mean to tell me that you couldn’t have taken a 
few extra seconds to look for the paper towels I asked for?’, the suggestion here being 
that my repertoire at the time included such a search capacity- and for that reason my 
failure is blameworthy.  We laugh easily at a comedy of errors because the character 
involved is usually the victim of his own lack of effort to do some simple thing.  Were he 
not competent in this area or lacked the required opportunity, derision would be out of 
place.  (The same thing is true of many real life cases of schadenfreude, I suppose.)   
Where harmful negligence is concerned, opprobrium tends to be inversely proportional to 
the ease with which the neglected duty could have been performed: ‘If you had just done 
what you were supposed to do, none of this would have happened’, the lament expressing 
the conviction that the offending party was perfectly situated and more than competent to 
meet certain modest expectations.  The ramifications of being subject to laws of nature 
hardly ever enters our minds in such situations, let alone the possibility of being 
empowered to make choices beyond their reach.  No, typically our sole concern in 
justifying our reactive attitudes is with an agent’s opportunities and skills.   
But won’t satisfying the last two clauses of SHA mean being able to violate a law 
of nature?  After all, if one of my motives and an ensuing action are nomologically 
related, then, if I am able to do anything else under the circumstances, then I am able, per 
impossible, to sever that tie.  And, in retrospect, agency does appear as self-initiated, not 
the effect of conation, a point upon which I shall elaborate below.  But SHA obviously 
must not be taken to have this implication, that anything but one's mental states are 
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responsible for his conduct.  To avoid it, Perry contends that motivation and 
competence/opportunity are separate matters.
5
 Reasons for acting merely determine the 
accomplishment for which an agent strives, without negating either his other 
opportunities or skills.  Thus, his motives should be prescinded in applying SHA: Perry 
denies what I shall call the principle of the Fixity of Motives (FM).  To do otherwise is to 
“enrich the circumstances” surrounding his accomplishment, making it appear as if no 
other doable options existed.  Were there other movements that I knew how to make in 
the store?     Were impediments to them lacking?  Would making them have amounted to 
another accomplishment, say, selecting plain towels?  If yes on all three counts, then I 
could have acted otherwise, my unwillingness to do so notwithstanding.  Should I come 
to regret not taking advantage of this opportunity, I would fault my motivation, not my 
skill set.  Thus, we retrospectively evaluate our conduct much like an accomplished chess 
player reviews his matches, looking to see if more would have been accomplished had 
other known gambits been tried.  It’s all about getting the most out of one’s learning.  A 
miscue is still a miscue, even if conatatively determined.    
Conceiving of agency in terms of SHA comes naturally to us.  It is, if you will, 
the default justification of our reactive attitudes.  Left to our own devices, scientific 
discoveries would have given us no reason to doubt that we act freely, since it is obvious 
that our actions do not exhaust (physically) possible accomplishments.  But our judgment 
in this matter has been hijacked by philosophers with religious agendas, bent on 
convincing us that we do not fully belong to the natural order, that we must exercise a 
sovereign power in making choices in order to be moral agents and stand for God’s Final 
Judgment.  Thus, tension exists between our knowledge of how nature works and our 
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self-image.   But if we could just get beyond this two millennia old false consciousness, 
we would regain the quiet assurance of our ancestors, secure in the knowledge that 
human persons can and do act freely, even while being subject to natural laws.
6
 Thus, PC 
consists of applying SHA to PA, denying FM to rebut counterexamples, and his neo-
Rousseauian plea for us to return to our conceptual roots, which he calls Revisionism.  I 
proceed to examine each strand. 
Conditionalism 
To begin with, SHA yields a Conditionalist account of what PA satisfaction 
means, Perry’s protestation to the contrary notwithstanding.  After all, it is put forth as a 
defense of Hume, who is unabashedly a Conditionalist:  
By liberty, then, we can only mean a power of acting or not acting 
according to the determinations of the will. Thus, liberty means that if we 
choose to remain at rest, we may; if we choose to move, we also may. But 




 Further, in discussing FM, Perry himself says:  
If I choose the skim rather than the lite, it will annoy my wife. I don’t want 
to annoy my wife. If I wanted to annoy my wife, that’s what I would do. 
Since I don’t want to annoy my wife, that’s not what I am going to do. It 
would be crazy to pick the skim and not the lite, unless I wanted to annoy 
my wife. My not being crazy is part of factor X. So it is not open to me to 
bring about the conjunction of picking the skim and having just the desires 
and preferences that I do, because the only motivation I would have for 
picking the skim and not the lite is that I would have different preferences 
than I do. If I pick the skim, given that my memory is intact, and I am not 




  The Conditionalist need not deny that an agent’s skills and opportunities are 
categorically possessed, existing independently of his interests.  His point is that what a 
free agent attempts to accomplish depends upon his will- what he wants and, hence, has 
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chosen to do, rather than the coercive will of another.  That is to say, which ability such 
an agent exercises in a given situation is a function of what he intends to ‘get out of it’, 
dictated by his desires, not the demands of others.  Were they significantly different, he 
would be relying on another skill, as he availed himself of another opportunity: he could 
do otherwise, if only he were so willing.  It is unconditionally true that this other skill and 
opportunity exist; that he can take advantage of them and, thus, satisfies PA, is only 
conditionally true, which is precisely what Hume maintains.  Thus, unless one conflates 
ability with its exercise there is no distinction to be drawn between PC and 
Conditionalism.   
But if the former is not an upgrade on the latter, then it begs the same question: 
Could the (mental) action of making a choice be free?  Is it unconditionally possible to do 
anything to avoid one’s choices?  Perry declines to discuss free choice of the will; but if 
SHA does not entail that we can satisfy PA on the basis of our skills and opportunities 
alone, then that discussion is unavoidable.  As we shall see, advantages along those lines 
do not entail freedom given the possibility of motivational shortcomings. 
Self-Control 
The competency clause (CC) of SHA could only be a facon de parler, given that 
it is intended as (part of) a defense of Hume.  Speaking of execution of movements by an 
agent makes it appear as if something like Agent Causal Libertarianism is being 
endorsed, according to which persons themselves are the uncaused causes of their 
volitions and the resulting actions.
9
 But Hume, of course, famously rejected the notion of 
a person or self existing independently of his/her states (their subject), controlling the 
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contents of his/her will.
10
 Perry’s own analysis of selfhood is constructed along Lockean 
lines, so that it does entail substantiality.
11
  Nevertheless, since he also endorses the 
doctrine of “natural causation,” according to which a person’s conative and doxastic 
states are the immediate causes of his volitions, there is no self-control in his philosophy 
either, no substantial executive at work in the production of volitions.
12
  Instead, the CC 
must reduce to something like ‘There is a type of movement M that the “agent’s” 
strongest desire (reducible, in turn, to a neural process) can produce’.  But this way of 
putting things exposes a flaw that PC shares with other forms of Compatibilism: it belies 
our sense that we do exercise self-control of the sort the agent-causalist posits.  That is to 
say, it implies that these basic movements would be done for one (a mere “bundle” of 
states, to the extent that one exists at all, in Hume’s version of the philosophy) rather than 
one being their executor.  I am not my desires/beliefs, the intimacy of our relationship 
notwithstanding.  Thus, to be told that my movements come at their behest is tantamount 
to being informed that I really have no accomplishments- am not an agent at all.  (I am a 
bystander to my own putative accomplishments.)  If there is anything here that is 
praiseworthy/blameworthy, it is “my” states, not me.  Since SHA is supposed to buttress 
our reactive attitudes, Perry, then, owes us an explanation of how one can be responsible 
for the doings of one’s desires/beliefs, which, in addition to not being one, are the effects 
of events in the distant past and often times arise unbidden. 
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As advertised, we shall see shortly how Saint Anselm's 2WT may be marshaled 
against PC, but another aspect of his philosophy of free will applies here, viz., the notion 
that the will is its own 'efficient cause.' 
Alvin Goldman briefly addresses this concern in A Theory of Human Action.  He 
writes, paraphrasing R.E. Hobart: 
(T)he past finished its business when it produced the agent as he is, with 
his wants and beliefs; it does not stretch out a ghostly hand to compete 
with these wants and beliefs in causing the agent’s acts.  Nor does it 
compete with the agent himself, as if he were some other agent, trying to 




Putting aside the distinctness and involuntariness issues, what you have, then, is 
partial control over your behavior, according to this model: what you do can never be 
entirely up to you.  Thus, it is something for which you are only partially responsible.  
Such an assessment is as good as it gets with PC and, indeed, any form of Compatibilism.  
Even should one find desirable certain desires, thus forming high-order volitions, this 
criticism would remain valid.  According to Harry Frankfurt, the “embracing” of one’s 
desires creates freedom in the will, that is, the choices that are the effects of those 
embraced desires are free for one’s embracing of their causes.14 But the embracing here- 
a choice- is also going to be the effect of a desire (all choices are, according to the 
Compatibilist) so that it is being made for one instead of by one.  If I am in control of 
myself (my mind) as I deliberate, then I am able by myself to make a choice appear 
before me: I am able to cause of myself a change in myself- willing to do one thing rather 
than another, having been undecided.  Since the Compatibilist refuses to acknowledge the 
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existence of such an (unnatural) power, there is simply no getting around the fact that his 
view entails an excuse for not owning up to one’s bad conduct: ‘Don’t blame it on me, 
but the desires with which I have been saddled’. 
Initiative  
Consider the following cases (and others like them): A performer who cancels a 
series of shows because of personal problems; A bright pupil suddenly bored by his 
studies; A world class athlete who has lost interest in his sport; A romance out of which 
the ‘spark’ has gone.  In each one, there is an agent suffering from a motivational 
deficiency: due to lack of initiative, he cannot bring himself to perform hitherto routine 
tasks.  ‘I can’t go on this evening’, ‘I can’t do any better in school’, ‘I can’t compete like 
I used to’, ‘We can’t see each other anymore’- all of these seem to be legitimate claims of 
inability.  But being hamstrung conatively entails neither a loss of skill nor opportunity.  
Thus, the above agents were able to act differently according to SHA.   
Yet we do say things such as, ‘She could have gone on tonight’ or ‘He should be 
doing much better at his studies’ or ‘He appears to be in great shape’ or ‘They needn’t 
have split up’.  The problem is, it’s not clear that the individuals at whom these remarks 
are directed are, all things considered, ‘up to’ engaging in their former activities.  Such 
remarks may only be our way of alluding to the fact that there is more to being able to 
accomplish something than having the required skills and opportunity, or attempts to 
instill initiative, so that the unavailing skills can be exercised.  (Indeed, they could be 
regarded as drawing attention to the fact that, though the person in question is free 
according to SHA, ultimately they are limiting themselves because of their choices, their 
failure to utilize the very freedom whose analysis Perry eschews, discussed below).  
 10 
Would we blame any of them for failing to meet our expectations?  Is there not a loss of 
self-control attendant upon conative failure?  Aren’t they all bound to fail, despite their 
skills and the opportunities presented them, until they are once again driven to succeed?  
If so, then FM appears true; we should not prescind from an agent’s motives in 
determining whether or not he can act otherwise.  Sans the proper motivation, an 
individual may be mired in failure, extant skills and beckoning opportunities 
notwithstanding.   
It is open to Perry to sustain his denial of FM by treating the above agents as 
impaired.  I have been assuming that their problems are purely psychological, to be 
distinguished from (say) laryngitis, a concussion, or arthritis.  Perhaps, though, their 
motivational deficiencies cause a temporary loss of the cognitive/motor skills that make 
up their competencies, or at least render their exercise physically impossible?  The 
problem then becomes the existence of motivational deficiencies in regards to others 
actions that are shunned, such as my refusal to disappoint my wife.  For, there appears to 
be no principled way to distinguish between those mental states entailing impairments 
and those that leave our skills intact and available.  All motives place limits on what we 
can do.  An agent’s strongest desire interferes with his ability to do things contrary to 
securing its object, making him no less incapable of other accomplishments than those 
now lacking an interest in or averse to former pursuits.  My desire to please my wife 
makes the ‘won't’ in ‘I won’t buy the plain towels’ akin to ‘would never’, making the 
whole sentence an expression of inability: to wit, ‘I would never do such a thing; I am 
simply incapable of it’. 
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It seems, then, that our motives are not only relevant to what we will do, but what 
we can do as well.  There is an all things considered sense of ‘can’ according to which 
lack of initiative entails an inability.  One may appeal to it to justify one’s unwillingness 
to blame another agent for his failure to do something or accept responsibility for one’s 
own failures.  If lacking competence or an opportunity constitutes a valid excuse for 
inaction, then inadequate motivation should as well.   
Free Agency as Involving Free Choice  
and Inconceivable Without It 
 
Let us suppose that the above objections to PC could be met.  Should we then 
automatically embrace Revisionism? Suggesting that we abandon our belief in the 
significance of freedom of the will is a controversial claim if ever there was one.   Could 
we simply sever our conception of free agency from (what seem to be) the more basic 
notion of free will?  Is it even possible to act freely sans a free will?  Isn’t free agency 
dependent upon freedom of choice, given that intentions are taken to cause as well as 
guide behavior?  Perry maintains that the belief in free will is an artifact of discredited 
religious dogmas.  Does it not belong to common sense as well?  Were the definitions of 
St. Augustine, St. Anselm, Duns Scotus, et al. mere stipulations, formulated whole cloth 
for religious purposes?  Or were they not based upon a widely shared intuition, viz., that 
control of our minds in choice formation is the sine qua non of our being free and 
responsible agents?  
Suppose I came to believe that my choices were being caused by someone else, 
content to otherwise leave me alone (risking the occasional case of akrasia).  Should I 
then conclude that, since he has left my skills intact and deprives me of no opportunities I 
would otherwise have, that my agency is yet free?  Or should I believe that my bodily 
 12 
movements, well-timed and skillful though they may be, share in my will’s loss of 
freedom?  Competence and opportunity are surely goods.  But would they alone make for 
true freedom, if our choices were beyond our control?  In positing SHA in lieu of a 
defense of free will, Revisionism only appears to point up, rather than rebut, Kant’s 
charge that Compatibilism is a “wretched subterfuge.” 
  Returning to Perry’s discussion of FM we can discern, in fact, a belief in 
precisely the sort of control the Revisionist is supposed to abjure.  To wit: 
It seems that I would think of things as follows.  If I choose the 
skim rather than the lite, it will annoy my wife.  I don’t want to annoy my 
wife.  If I wanted to annoy my wife, that’s what I would do.  Since I don’t 
want to annoy my wife that’s not what I’m going to do.  It would be crazy 




On whose authority was this resolution made- just who is the ‘I’ engaging in this 
act of self-examination?  Whence the confidence that precisely those desires and 
preferences will become directives?  (As a Humean, it cannot be the belief that the two 
are necessarily connected.)  Why would anyone think that they are conatively related 
unless he has reason to believe that it’s wholly up to him what becomes salient, decisive?  
Further, whence the preference for comity and reasonableness?  Here too we must 
employ the language of free choice, lest we invite Kant’s charge.  For if he had not freely 
chosen these values over competing inclinations, if he’s just ‘always been that way’, then 
he hardly deserves credit for his cooperation.  If something as basic to practical reasoning 
as value formation is taken to be beyond one’s control, then philosophical rigor enjoins 
Hard Determinism, instead of an attempt to persuade us to refashion our own self-image.  
At the end of the day, should I become convinced that I am not in charge of my decision-
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making, that my choices can be attributed to something besides exercises of self-control, 
I can no longer regard myself as a free agent, no matter my skills and opportunities.        
Conclusion 
PC turns out to beg the same questions regarding free choice and self-control as 
other forms of Compatibilism.  Further, it fails to recognize the importance of initiative in 
free agency.  But even a remedy of these flaws should not persuade us abandon our belief 
in the significance of free choice of the will.  Free agents must exercise that power.  
  
